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David R HeiseAbstract
The largest in-depth cross-cultural study of the 20th Century, directed by psychologist Charles Osgood at the
University of Illinois, demonstrated that the affective meanings of concepts vary along three dimensions within
all 30 cultures considered in the project, and for individuals responding in more than 21 languages. I analyze data on 17
cultures from this project in order to get some insights on how cultures differ in their sentiments and how sentiments
about some concepts vary across cultures. An affective map of the cultures derived with multi-dimensional scaling
revealed that affective similarities and differences among cultures cannot be explained in terms of geography, nationality,
or major religions. Underlying dimensions of the affective map perhaps relate to secularization and to a history of
slavery/colonization. Meanwhile, sentiments about most concepts are remarkably similar across cultures, compared to
the divergences of sentiments about different concepts. Thus, ubiquitous breakdowns in inter-cultural understandings
must emerge from relatively small variations in feelings, or from issues where there are major differences in sentiments
across cultures.
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is recognizing and celebrating early contributors to
intercultural research, and University of Illinois psychologist
Charles Osgood (1916 – 1991) was one of the most
illustrious of these pioneers. A full biography is available
elsewhere (Tzeng, 1990). Here I want only to observe that
Osgood organized and managed the largest in depth
cross-cultural study of the 20th century. That monumental
study demonstrated beyond any doubt that affective
meaning varies along three dimensions, within all 30
cultures considered in the project, for individuals
responding in more than 21 indigenous languages.
Heise (2007), pp. 7–8 characterized the three dimensions
as follows.
Sentiments have three aspects. Evaluation concerns
goodness versus badness, Potency concerns
powerfulness versus powerlessness, and Activity
concerns liveliness versus quietness. The three aspects
are abbreviated EPA. Each aspect, or dimension, of
sentiments can be characterized by a variety of
contrasts. [For example] some words characterizing
the positive side of the Evaluation dimension are: nice,
sweet, heavenly, good, mild, happy, fine, clean.Correspondence: heise@indiana.edu
Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Indiana, USA
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in any medium, provided the original work is pCorresponding words for the negative side are: awful,
sour, hellish, bad, harsh, sad, course, dirty. …
Characterizations within each dimension are
correlated. For example, something judged sweet is
likely to be judged clean also. Characterizations across
dimensions are uncorrelated. For example, sensing
that something is powerful provides no clue as to
whether it is good or bad.
These three basic dimensions of affective meaning
were verified in each of 21 communities around the
world as follows. First, researchers obtained indigenes’
adjective associations to 100 concepts that were familiar
in all of the communities—concepts like mother, danger,
and thunder. The second step was to have indigenes in
each of the communities pair the adjectives that were
acquired in the first step with opposites—e.g., good with
bad, thereby forming end-points for 50 rating scales. In
the third step 200 indigenous teenaged males rated the
100 concepts on the 50 scales. The ratings of the different
respondents were averaged to get a single rating on each
scale for each concept.
The final step involved factor analyzing the averaged
ratings pan-culturally. That is, 50 scales in 21 cultures
provided a total of 1050 variables. These variables were
correlated across the 100 concepts, and the correlationn Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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three factors were recognizably the Evaluation, Potency,
and Activity dimensions that had been discovered in
previous work within American culture (Osgood, Suci,
and Tannenbaum, 1957). The second goal was to see
whether every culture had scales loading on all three
dimensions, indicating that every community made
judgments along the same three dimensions as applied in
other communities.
I forego further details about this monumental study
because all that is necessary here is to emphasize that
every precaution was taken to make sure that emergence
of these dimensions in the different cultures was not a
function merely of translating scales from English.
Complete details on the study are provided in the book
by Osgood, May, and Miron (1975), and a summary of
the study is provided by Heise (2010).
Researchers in each community used twelve of the
scales from the pan-cultural study—four scales for each
EPA dimension—to assess the affective meanings of 620
concepts, with 40 teenaged males providing ratings of
each concept. The intention of this part of the study was
to create a cross-cultural Atlas that would provide a
rigorous basis for cross-cultural analyses of affective
meanings. Moreover, by the end of the project, data on
the 620 concepts were collected in nine additional
cultures beyond the 21 cultures included in the pan-cultural
analyses.
The atlas dataset
A few years after the publication of the Osgood et al. (1975)
book, Charles Osgood was struck with a mentally incapaci-
tating disease, and the project center on the University of
Illinois campus disorganized. Data collected in the
pan-cultural study, including the Atlas data, all were lost.
Fortunately, in 1978 at the University of Illinois
bookstore I purchased a computer printout of results
from the project containing results for 17 of the 30
cultures. I kept the printout in my files until I retired from
teaching in 2001. At that point I scanned the printout
sheets into electronic form, and I used optical character
recognition technology to digitize the Atlas tables giving
the mean ratings of 620 concepts by indigenous male
teenagers in the 17 cultures. These data are the materials
that I analyze in this talka.
There are pros and cons in using the remnants of the
cross-cultural Atlas for contemporary research. On
one hand, the data are 50 years old, so findings may
be out of date about specific cultures. Countering this
consideration, the data were collected before globalization,
and therefore these data give a unique picture of diversity
in cross-cultural affective meanings before extensive
intercontinental business, travel, and electronics shrank
the world.Another factor is that data loss cripples the overall
dataset substantially. Data were lost from European
cultures (Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy,
Sweden, and Hungary) and data also were lost from
important Asian cultures (China, Japan, and two sites
in Afghanistan). On the other hand, the data that still
exist cover a variety of cultural communities worldwide:
American Whites and American Blacks, Germans, Dutch,
Yugoslavians, Turks, Iranians, Lebanese, Israelis, Indians
from both New Delhi and Calcutta, Thais, Malays,
Mexicans from Mexico City and Yucatan, Costa Ricans,
and Brazilians.
Another weakness of the Atlas data is that ratings
were obtained for only 620 concepts in each culture,
whereas contemporary surveys using the EPA system for
measuring affective meanings deal with 1500 to 3000
concepts (Heise, 2010). However, the contemporary surveys
deal only with concepts relating to social interaction—role
identities, interpersonal behaviors, social settings, and
personal modifiers. The Atlas was designed to assess
affective meanings for a broader variety of concepts
relating to time, kinship, abstract symbolism, concrete
symbolisms, environmental matters, carnalities, human
activity, interpersonal relations, society, communications,
philosophy, and ordinary things and stuff.
Finally, the Atlas data have missing data in some cultures,
occasionally because a concept was inadvertently dropped,
but usually because some concepts were too inflam-
matory to present in certain cultures. Thus, for example,
homosexual was not rated in seven societies. On the other
hand, there is no missing data at all for 532 concepts, and
ratings were obtained in all but one or two communities
for 606 concepts.
Measuring distances
In this study I assess intercultural differences by measuring
how far apart affective meanings are for each pair of
cultures. Computing distance involves two steps. First,
we measure how far apart the two communities are in
their affective meaning of each particular concept. Second,
we combine the distances for particular concepts into an
overall distance between the two cultures.
Measuring meaning distances is possible because
respondents rated concepts on EPA scales like the
ones displayed in Figure 1. (Figure 1 shows the
White-American scales that were used in the Atlas
study). Ratings at the seven positions on each scale
were coded as follows. The middle, or neutral, position
was coded 0. Positions one place out from the middle,
representing the adverb slightly, were coded +1 or -1: plus
if on the nice, powerful, or fast side, and minus if on the
awful, powerless, or slow side. Positions two places out
from the middle, representing the adverb quite, were
coded +2 or -2. Positions three places out from the
Figure 1 Rating scales used to obtain data among White Americans. Scales in other cultures were derived independently within the culture’s
indigenous language.
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or -3. Ratings on the four scales for a particular dimension
where averaged to get a respondent’s positioning of a
concept on that dimension, and the average ratings for all
40 respondents where averaged to get the culture’s
positioning of the concept on that dimension.
Each concept has three numbers attached to it—an EPA
profile, with each number varying from −3 to +3. Minus
values represent awfulness, powerlessness, or inactivity;
and positive values represent niceness, powerfulness, or
activity.
The distance between two concepts could be obtained
by summing the absolute differences between the ratings
on the three dimensions. Suppose, for example, that one
concept is rated as slightly nice (+1), quite potent (2.0),
and slightly inactive (−1.0). And suppose that another
concept is rated as quite awful (−2.0), between neutral
and slightly potent (0.5), and slightly active (1.0). Then
the difference in affective meanings of the concepts can
be computed as ((1) – (−2)) + ((2) – (0.5)) + ((1) – (−1)),
or 6.5. However, absolute differences do not provide ameasure corresponding to ordinary geometric distances,
so instead I used Euclidean distances, which require
squaring each of the differences before summing, and
then taking the square root of the sum. (The Euclidean
distance for this problem is 3.9).
To get the total distance between two cultures, I
squared the Euclidean distance between the two cultures
for each separate concept, summed the squares across
all conceptsb, and used the result as a measure of overall
cultural distance in affective meaning. For example, this
procedure showed that American Whites and American
Blacks have a distance of 33.57. Meanwhile American
Whites and Germans have an affective cultural distance
of 32.8. American Blacks and Germans have a distance
of 43.99.
Multidimensional scaling
I conducted a nonmetric multidimensional scaling of the
data, trying to reproduce the distances between cultures
as distances in a physical space. For example, could the
17 cultures be positioned in a room-like space so that
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very distant in the three-dimensional space of the room?
Or could the distances between cultures be reproduced
on a two-dimensional space, like a sheet of paper? Three
and two dimensional spaces are useful for visualizing
distances, but in principle reproducing cultural distances
might require higher dimensional spaces that cannot be
visualized easily.
A quantity produced during the scaling process called
“stress” measures how well the inferred distances match
the empirical distances, and this quantity provides
guidance about how many dimensions are necessary. In
this problem, if we try to reproduce all of the distances
between cultures in a one-dimensional space (that is,
along a line), the stress of the solution is a large value of
0.32. A two-dimensional solution reduces stress con-
siderably to about 0.13. A three-dimensional solution
reduces stress somewhat more to 0.07. The sequence of
stress values for solutions with more than three dimen-
sions declines slowly in a manner suggesting that the extra
dimensions only are accommodating random variations.
Thus, the solution in this case is either two-dimensional
or three-dimensional.
Comparing the two and three dimensional solutions
reveals that the three-dimensional solution is essentially
the same as the two-dimensional solution except that
Brazil projects out on a dimension of its own. In the
two-dimensional solution Brazil is positioned at an
extreme edge of the diagram in order to represent its
divergence from other cultures (as can be seen in Figure 2).Figure 2 Results of a nonmetric multidimensional scaling. The chart show
representation.This report uses the two-dimensional solution for further
analyses, both because it provides a reasonable repre-
sentation of the empirical distances and because a
two-dimensional solution is easy to visualize.
Possible explanations
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 17 cultures in a
representation where physical distances correspond to
cultural distances in affective meanings. For example,
Yugoslavia and Iran are very far apart on the graph,
corresponding to the fact that their affective meanings
are very different. Germany and Brazil are far apart
physically, corresponding to the fact that they, too, are
far apart in affective meanings. Mexico City and Costa
Rica are close on the graph, corresponding to the fact
that affective meanings in these two cultures are similar.
Figure 2 shows the basic configuration of cultural
distances between all 17 communities, and thereby can
serve as the basis for testing possible explanations of
why cultures are similar or dissimilar.
A first hypothesis derives from the fact that cultures in
the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF, 2008) are organized
by regions and sub-regions. This may be largely an adminis-
trative convenience, but it raises the question of whether
geographic propinquity is a factor that explains cultural
similarity. The hypothesis garners some support in Figure 2
in that the three topmost cultures are European (Germany,
Netherlands, and Yugoslavia). Of course, many European
cultures in the Atlas were lost so we cannot see whether
such clustering would remain if Belgium, Finland, France,s cultures’ overall distances in affective meanings, in a two-dimensional
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any case, cultures representing other geographic regions do
not cluster. Middle Eastern cultures span the width of the
graph from Iran on one side, through Turkey and Israel, to
Lebanon on the other side. Asian cultures—Calcutta India,
Thailand, New Delhi India, and Malaysia—are similarly
spread out even if not as extremely as the Middle Eastern
cultures. New World cultures—U.S. Whites, Costa Rica,
Mexico City, Yucatán, Brazil and U.S. Blacks—range up and
down on the chart and from side to side. Thus, Figure 2
offers no convincing evidence that cultural similarity
corresponds to co-presence in geographic regions.
A related hypothesis is that cultures within the same
nation are more similar than cultures of different
nations. This is testable because in three cases we have
measurements from multiple communities within a
single nation. The hypothesis does not fare well. The
cultures of U.S. Whites and of U.S. Blacks are separated
by a greater distance than separates the cultures of many
nations. Similarly the cultures maintained in New
Delhi and Calcutta India are more distant than many
national cultures are. The two cultures measured in
Mexico—Mexico City and Yucatán—are closer together
than many other culture pairs, but even here the two
are far from super-imposed. Thus the hypothesis that
nationality determines culture may be rejected.
Major religions influence sentiments about some
concepts so another hypothesis worth checking is that
societies with the same predominating religion are
culturally similar. However the cultures in predominantly
Christian societies (Germany, Netherlands, U.S. Whites,
Costa Rica, Mexico City, Yucatán, U.S. Blacks, and Brazil)
are spread from top to bottom in Figure 2. Muslim
cultures (Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, and Lebanon) are spread
across the diagram. The two Hindu communities
(Calcutta and New Delhi India) are across the diagram
from one another. (Three other cultures – Israel,
Thailand, and Yugoslavia – are single representatives of
Judaism, Buddhism, and communism respectively.) Thus
there is not much support for a religion connection
to cultural similarity.
Implicit dimensions
Yet intuitively Figure 2 does seem to have some substantive
structure. Suppose that the graph were rotated so that the
horizontal dimension passed from Iran to Yugoslavia. Then
the horizontal axis might be viewed as something like
ecclesiasticism versus secularism. That is, the communist
society of Yugoslavia in the mid-20th century represents the
epitome of secularism, and Iran currently is an extreme
ecclesiastical society (though the ecclesiastical struc-
ture was only imminent in pre-revolutionary Iran at
mid-20th Century). This interpretation of the rotated
axis is strengthened by examining some of the specificconcepts that most differ in Iran versus Yugoslavia. For
example, large evaluation differences of 2.5 or more occur
for Prophet, Capitalism, God, Growing, Blood, Religion,
King, Law, Prayer, Hospital, Tooth, and Homosexual, with
Iran more positive for all of these concepts. A third of
these concepts relate to religion. Differences in affective
meanings also emerge on the Activity dimension, with
Iran usually attributing more activity to concepts.
Rotating the graph in order to make the horizontal
dimension correspond to secularism versus ecclesiasticism
raises the issue of what the vertical dimension would be in
such a case. The vertical dimension, being perpendicular
to the horizontal dimension, should represent something
uncorrelated with secularism versus ecclesiasticism. The
contrasting cultures in this case are Germany versus U.S.
Blacks. Specific concepts that most differentiate these
two cultures include the following: Debt, Fighting,
Baldness, Being Aggressive, Envy, Wine, Graft, Lying,
Competition, Anger, November, Hunger, Bride, Defeat,
Caste, Fear, and Sickness. U.S. Blacks rated all of
these except Wine and Bride less negatively on the
Evaluation dimension than did Germans. U.S. Blacks
also attributed lower activity to Fighting, Being aggressive,
Earthquake, Machine, Gramophone, Thunder, City, Youth,
Jazz music, Adolescence, Play, and Boy. Speculating, U.S.
Blacks compared to Germans seem more accepting of
emotions and consequences of social oppression; plus U.S.
Blacks compared to Germans seem inclined to stay
inactive or “cool” with regard to aggression and youth,
which might be a wise strategy for an oppressed group.
Such interpretations accord with previous discussions of
the data from U.S. Blacks (Landis, McGrew, Day, Savage,
and Saral, 1976; Sewell and Heise, 2010). Thus a possible
interpretation of the second dimension is that it relates to
a history of slavery and colonialism, with the controllers
developing one set of affective meanings and the controlled
developing another set.
Distances for individual concepts
The Atlas data provide abundant opportunities to
examine cultural differences in the affective meanings of
specific concepts. I examine some of these differences
in this section as a way of further elucidating cultural
similarities and differences.
A set of distances was computed for all 136 pairs of
the seventeen Atlas cultures, for each of the 620
concepts in the Atlas. The median of the 136 distances
for each concept is the statistic of interest here. Figure 3
displays a histogram showing the number of concepts at
each interval of median distance. The bell shape of the
distribution indicates that median distances between
cultures’ affective meanings for concepts are small for
some concepts (e.g., Person, Stranger, and Neutrality)
and large for some other concepts (e.g., Creature, Army,
Figure 3 Distributions of median inter-cultural distances in affective meanings of 620 concepts. Each median is based on 136 pairs of
cultures. Black bars show the distribution among real cultures. White bars show the distribution among randomly-constructed cultures.
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in the middle).
Frequencies of concepts peak at the median distances
of 1.1 and 1.2. That indicates that the typical difference
between cultures in the affective meaning of a concept is
a bit more than the difference between rating something
as slightly good (a value of +1) versus quite good (+2),
or quite powerful (+2) versus extremely powerful (+3),
or slightly inactive (−1) versus neither inactive or active
(0). Of course, maximum distances between Atlas
cultures in the affective meanings of concepts are larger,
up to 5.0 (which is the distance between Germany and
Malaysia for the concept of “wine”). Nevertheless, the
result for median distances does seem to indicate that
cultural differences in sentiments are small.
Figure 3 also shows distances among imaginary
cultures created with random affective meanings, for
comparison with the distances among real cultures.
The random results were obtained as follows. Within
each EPA dimension and within each culture, the 620
mean ratings served as a population for drawing random
values to assign to concepts. For example, German mean
evaluations of the 620 concepts (ranging from −2.8 to +2.8
with a mean value of 0.77) served as a population of num-
bers from which new evaluations of concepts were drawn.
To take a particular instance, the original mean evaluation
of wine by German respondents was 2.3, and in the
imaginary culture based on German EPAs this was
replaced with 1.5, which was the mean evaluation byGerman respondents of some other concept. This method
of randomization assured realistic random EPA values
corresponding to actual EPA values within each culture.
Seventeen imaginary cultures were created this way, each
having EPA ratings generated randomly from one of the 17
actual cultures. The imaginary cultures served as the basis
for re-computing median distances, with the results
displayed in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows that the distribution of distances among
imaginary cultures with random affective meanings shifts
to the right, indicating that random meanings are further
apart on average than affective meanings within real
cultures. This reinforces the conclusion that cultures have
similar affective meanings for most concepts.
Figure 4 shows cross-cultural variations for four concepts
with distances in the intermediate range– Mother, Child,
Soldier, and Enemy. Having all four concepts on the same
graph demonstrates that intra-concept variations across
cultures are less than the inter-concept variations in the
average position of concepts. For example, Evaluation
and Potency ratings of Enemy vary cross-culturally, and
Evaluation and Potency ratings of Soldier also vary
cross-culturally, but ellipsoids enclosing the average
ratings of all 17 cultures for each concept do not
intersect. Similarly, in all cultures Mother and Child are
felt to be good while differing substantially in potency. An
ellipsoid around all the cultural meanings of Mother and
another ellipsoid around all the cultural meanings of Child
intersect some, but the two ellipsoids are mostly distinct.
Figure 4 Cross-cultural variations in affective meanings of Mother, Child, Soldier, and Enemy. The graphic shows that cross-cultural variations
often are less than inter-concept variations.
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Soldier and Mother are most intermingled on Evaluation
and Potency, yet Soldier typically is more active than
Mother (as indicated in Figure 3 by the larger symbols for
Soldier) so ellipsoids for the two concepts would intersect
only a little in the three-dimensional space.
Such findings lead to the speculation that affective
meanings of particular concepts are largely the same
cross-culturally, compared to differences in affective
meanings between concepts. Evaluation ratings should
correlate from one culture to another when computed
across the 620 concepts. Similarly, Potency ratings of the
620 concepts should correlate across cultures, and
Activity ratings should correlate across cultures. If
within-dimension ratings of the 620 concepts correlate
in all 17 cultures, then a single factor should emerge
when the 17-by-17 matrix of inter-cultural correlations is
factor analyzed. That is, a factor analysis of cross-cultural
correlations of Evaluation ratings should be characterized
by a single dominant factor, and the same should be true
for Potency and Activity.
Figure 5 shows the size of each successive factor
when the correlations between the 17 cultures are
factor analyzedc. These results confirm the hypothesis
of intercultural similarity in affective meanings for
Evaluation and Potency. That is, Evaluations and Potenciesof different concepts are correlated across all cultures. A
dominant factor also is evident in the case of Activity,
although the diagram shows that two additional factors
also contribute to cross-cultural Activity correlations,
indicating that there are clusters of cultures with
higher Activity correlations within each cluster than
between the clustersd.
To summarize, intercultural differences in affective
meaning are very large for a few concepts and very small
for a few concepts, while the vast majority of intercultural
differences in affective meanings are moderate. Even the
moderate intercultural differences in affective meaning are
relatively small compared to differences in affective
meaning for different concepts. The implication is that
affective meanings are shared across cultures to a large
extent, and a series of factor analyses of intercultural
correlations within each of the EPA dimensions revealed
considerable parallelism.
Significance of cross-cultural differences
Correlations among cultures’ affective meanings make one
wonder whether the majority of cultural differences in
affective meaning really matter. This issue might be
examined empirically by observing an equivalent inter-
action in different cultures to see if actions and reactions
and accompanying emotions vary in any notable ways.
Figure 5 Cross-cultural similarity in Evaluation, Potency, and Activity ratings of concepts. The graphs show the sizes of each successive
factor when correlations in affective meanings between the 17 cultures are factor analyzed. Affective meanings of different concepts are
correlated across cultures to the extent that the first factor is much larger than later factors.
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interactions are distinctive in different cultures.
An empirical cross-cultural study of this kind would
be costly, but social psychology models are advanced
enough at this point so that we can examine the issue
through computer simulations. In particular, a program
called Interact associated with affect control theory can
be applied.
The basic idea in affect control theory is that humans
try to experience the familiar. On the cognitive side, that
means trying to fit new experiences into culturally available
categories. On the affective side that is the focus of affect
control theory, the principal means matching feelings
experienced in actual situations with culturally normative
sentiments. In particular, individuals try to design their
actions so that their actions will produce feelings affirming
cultural sentiments. A variety of studies have provided
empirical support for affect control theory (Heise, 2013;
Heise and Lerner, 2006; Heise and Weir, 1999; Schröder
and Scholl, 2009; Smith-Lovin and Douglass, 1992; Wiggins
and Heise, 1987), and various authorities have commended
the theory (Clore and Pappas, 2007; Fararo, 1989; Kemper,
1991; Scholl, 2013). A detailed presentation of affect
control theory is provided by Heise (2007).
Affect control theory employs a mathematical model
grounded in quantitative measurements on the EPA
dimensions, and the computer program Interact takes
care of the mathematical analyses. Analyzing a social
situation with Interact begins by specifying the identities of
interactants. The program translates the identities into EPA
profiles that the interactants try to confirm, computes the
EPA profile for expected behaviors between the characters,
and translates the behavior profiles into named behaviors.
Specifying that a behavior actually occurred causes Interact
to provide a variety of information about the action and its
possible consequences.
For example suppose that we want to analyze interaction
between a father and a daughter. We tell Interact that two
people with those identities are interacting, and Interacttranslates the identity specifications into culturally defined
EPA sentimentse for father (2.46 2.54 0.76) and daughter
(1.47 -0.04 1.11). Then we ask, what would a father do to a
daughter? Interact computes the EPA profile (2.19 2.37
0.35) for the behavior that would produce feelings about
the two characters most matching the cultural sentiments
applying to them, and reports that reason with is one
such behavior. We ask Interact to implement reason
with, and Interact reports how the father and daughter
feel emotionally during this action, indicating emotions
both with words and emotional expressions on computer-
drawn faces. Interact also predicts what each of the charac-
ters might do next after the father reasons with daughter.
Additionally Interact reports how the individuals might be
reconceptualized in various ways as a result of the action.
For example, how might we view a father who reasons with
his daughter (considerate, perceptive, forgiving), or how
might we view a daughter who is reasoned with by her
father (sensitive, sympathetic, modest).
Storekeeper-customer interaction
I used Interact to examine the first behavior in storekeeper-
customer interactions within each of the 17 Atlas cultures,
plus contemporary American culture assessed among males
at Indiana University in 2004. Among the Atlas cultures,
the EPA profile for Storekeeper was used for the store-
keeper, and the customer’s identity was specified in terms
of the EPA profile for Most people. The Indiana analysis
used the identities ofMerchant and Customer. Table 1 gives
the EPA profiles of each identity in the 18 cultures.
Interact derived the EPA profile for the optimal behav-
ior of merchant to customer in each culture, and imple-
mentation of this action allowed Interact to compute
interactants’ accompanying emotionsf. K-means cluster-
ing applied to the EPA profiles of the interactants’
identities, the EPA profiles of the predicted first action,
and the interactants’ emotion EPA profiles during the
first action reduced the 18 sets of results to five different
patterns.
Table 1 Evaluation, potency, and activity ratings of
storekeeper and most people in 17 cultures
(merchant and customer for 2004 U.S. Whites)
Storekeeper Most people
Culture E P A E P A
Brazil 1.2 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.6
Calcutta 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.7
2004 U.S. Whites 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.5 0.9
Costa Rica 1.1 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.3 0.8
Germany 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.7
Iran 1.3 0.0 1.4 1.2 0.5 1.5
Israel 0.3 −0.3 −0.1 0.1 0.5 0.0
Lebanon 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1
Malaysia 1.8 0.3 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.6
Mexico City 0.9 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.7
Netherlands 0.8 0.1 0.3 −0.2 0.7 0.2
New Delhi 1.1 0.7 −0.5 1.2 0.6 0.0
Thailand 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.5 −0.1
Turkey 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.2
U.S. Blacks 1.0 0.6 −0.4 1.3 0.7 −0.1
U.S. Whites 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9
Yucatan 1.9 0.7 0.5 1.5 1.3 1.0
Yugoslavia −0.8 −0.6 0.0 1.1 1.3 −0.2
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shows the mean EPA profiles for optimal behaviors,
storekeeper emotions, and customer emotions, averaged
over all of the cultures in a cluster.
Figure 6 also lists the cultures in each cluster, and
expands the numerical results in Table 2 by offering a
verbal description of the first action of storekeeper to
customer within each cluster. The verbal behavior was
obtained by finding a named behavior whose EPA profile
among Indiana males in 2004 was close to the mean
profile for the optimal behavior in a cluster. The description
of the storekeeper’s action is inexact since it is not
based on behavior measurements made in the cultures
within a cluster, but the description does provide someTable 2 Mean evaluation, potency, and activity values for pre
within each k-means cluster
Cluster Behavior
E P
Iran, Malaysia, 2004 U.S. Whites, Yucatan 1.56 0.17
New Delhi, Thailand, U.S. Blacks 1.20 0.51
Brazil, Costa Rica, Germany, Mexico City, U.S. Whites 1.20 0.39
Calcutta, Israel, Lebanon, Netherlands, Turkey 0.61 0.11
Yugoslavia 0.10 −0.72sense of how the first action varies from one cluster to
another.
Additionally Figure 6 presents the computer-drawn
facial expressions of storekeeper and customer during
the first action of their encounter. The facial expressions
were drawn by Interact from the mean EPA profiles for
emotions given in Table 2. The mean EPA profiles for
behaviors, storekeeper emotions, and customer emotions
within the five clusters are provided in Table 2.
Examining Figure 6, we see that predicted behaviors in
all clusters are plausible ways that a merchant might
engage a customer, but the nature of the interaction
varies cross culturally. In cluster A (upper left), the
relationship is egalitarian. In cluster B (next down) the
merchant is quietly attentive. In cluster C (lower left)
the merchant is businesslike. In cluster D (upper right)
the merchant is supplicating. In Cluster E, comprised of
only Yugoslavia, (lower right) the merchant acts in a
servile manner. Facial expressions of emotion in clusters A
through D indicate mutually engaged parties having a
pleasant encounter. In cluster B both storekeeper and
customer appear reserved but positive. In E the encounter
is somewhat strained. Overall, this analysis suggests that
the merchant-customer relation might be realized cross
culturally with at least five distinctive kinds of action, and
three emotional tones.
Because of the substantial similarity in affective mean-
ings of relevant concepts cross-culturally, travelers can
accomplish commercial exchanges everywhere, and usually
enjoy them, even though in some places the interaction
may have a foreign quality, at variance with what one
learned to expect at home. Nevertheless, variant forms of
the relationship may have different consequences—e.g.,
some storekeeper-customer relationships may be more
efficacious than others in terms of sales made, or customer
satisfaction.
Conclusions
Analyses of cross cultural data collected in the mid-20th
century show that similarities and differences in cul-
tures’ affective meanings are not based on geography,
nationality, or religious creed. Cultures do vary alongdicted behaviors and emotions, averaged across cultures
Storekeeper emotion Customer emotion
A E P A E P A
0.75 1.91 0.18 1.04 1.42 0.37 0.61
−0.46 1.58 0.53 0.46 1.21 −0.30 0.63
0.26 1.55 0.46 0.87 1.25 −0.08 0.63
0.17 0.99 0.24 0.86 0.93 −0.24 0.53
0.13 1.21 −0.51 0.80 0.89 −0.40 0.52
Figure 6 Simulations of a storekeeper-customer encounter. Panels A through E each represents a cluster of cultures that is largely
homogeneous with regard to simulated behaviors and emotions arising in a storekeeper-customer encounter. The displayed behaviors and
emotions, based on EPA profiles presented in Table 2, were obtained with software for simulating social interactions.
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versus-ecclesiasticism, and a dimension relating to
colonialism and slavery that contrasts cultures of the con-
trollers with cultures that emerged among the controlled.
Intercultural differences in affective meanings of spe-
cific concepts are large in a few cases, very small in a
few cases, and moderate in the vast majority of cases.
Cultures largely agree regarding the affective meanings
of most concepts, at least in the sense that cultural
differences for any specific concept are relatively small
compared to average cross-cultural feelings about different
concepts. Heise (2001) obtained similar results, using a cor-
relational methodology instead of the distances computed
here. This suggests that feelings about things have an onto-
logical core that is largely shared across cultures—for
example, war is bad, mothers are good, and children are
weak. Future studies might profitably pursue this notion in
studies of morality and ethics.
Observing that cultural differences are relatively
small does not necessarily mean that they are irrele-
vant. A cross-cultural simulation analysis of the storekeeper-customer relationship indicated cross-cultural differ-
ences in behaviors and emotions within the relation-
ship that probably have material consequences for this
market mechanism in terms of its efficiency and in-
trinsic satisfaction. A similar analysis of mother-child
relationships cross-culturally (not reported here) produced
differences that might have important consequences in
socializing individuals with various personality traits. The
strategy introduced here of clustering data and simulation
results may provide a path for studying such matters
economically. Use sentiments data obtained in surveys
to identify clusters of cultures, and study the phenomenon
of interest ethnographically in a representative of each
cultural cluster.
The data analyzed here were collected in the mid-20th
century before large scale globalization. The convergence
of affective meanings in the mid-20th century suggests
that diversity already was limited before international
business, travel, and electronic media shrank the world.
Furthermore, data collected since the Atlas study
(see Heise, 2010) suggest that as much diversity in affective
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globalized world.
Overall we have found in this study that something
about a given concept makes people everywhere tend
to converge on a more-or-less shared affective meaning for
the concept, but other somethings impel different groups
to develop their own slant with regard to the affective
meaning of that concept. This is true in the globalized
world as much as it was true in the pre-globalized world.
Endnotes
aPlease download the photocopies of the printouts and
the digitized files of the Atlas data so that there is no chance
of losing these valuable data in the future. Practically none
of the potential of the data has been tapped. Osgood et al.
(1975) systematically analyzed only colors, and other
reports based on the data dealt with a specific culture
(e.g., Landis, McGrew, Day, Savage, and Saral, 1976). Thus
the data still can serve as a basis for myriad future analyses.
The URL at which you will find the materials for download
is http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/Atlas/.
bThe summations were over all 620 concepts, with
missing data values imputed as the average distance
among all cultures with empirical data for the given
concept. I also computed the distances with listwise
deletion of cases with missing data, and obtained
essentially the same results.
cTechnically, Figure 4 shows scree diagrams of the
eigenvalues resulting from Q-method component analyses
of Evaluation scores, Potency scores, and Activity scores.
Correlations between cultures’ Evaluations ranged from
0.38 to 0.90, with all but one in the range 0.51 to
0.90. Correlations between cultures’ Potency means
ranged from 0.24 to 0.82. Activity correlations ranged
from −0.18 to 0.80, with 70 percent of the correlations
having a value of 0.20 or higher. Missing data was
handled in the correlation analyses by listwise deletion,
giving 535 concepts for Evaluation and Activity, and 533
for Potency.
Lack of completely smooth curves after the first eigen-
values in Figure 4 suggests that some clustering of
cultures also occurs with regard to Evaluation and Potency
scores. On Evaluation: a component groups Germany,
Israel, Netherlands, U.S. Blacks, Yugoslavia; another
groups Iran, Lebanon, New Delhi, Calcutta, Malaysia; and
a third contrasts U.S. Blacks and Brazil. On Potency: a
component groups Germany and the Netherlands; and
another groups Yugoslavia and Lebanon. On Activity: a
component groups Turkey, Iran, Calcutta, Malaysia,
Mexico, Costa Rica; another groups Yugoslavia, Lebanon,
New Delhi, Thailand; and a third groups U.S. Blacks,
Germany, Netherlands, Israel, Brazil. A major study is
needed to examine such cultural clusters and the concepts
contributing to them.dThis example uses sentiment measurements obtained
from undergraduate males in Indiana, 2002–2004.
eThese analyses used Atlas EPA profiles for Storekeeper
and Most People. EPA profiles for behaviors and
emotions were derived with impression-formation equa-
tions estimated in a U.S.A. study. Thus the basic data are
indigenous, but predictions derived from the data involve
non-indigenous equations which might introduce some
errors into the predictions.
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